Red lines that are not negotiable
Weapons of mass destruction and mass-casualty or critical-infrastructure targeting. Sexual content involving minors. Self-propagating or destructive malware intended for indiscriminate harm. Theft of real credentials, secrets or personal data. Operations against real named people or systems the operator is not authorized to test.
BoundaryIndependent, deterministic, hash-pinned boundary controls exist for the mass-casualty class only. For the other red lines, the model’s trained refusal is currently the only layer, and a trained refusal is a statistical tendency, not a guarantee.
Designed to be is not the same as measured to be
We do not conflate the two. The model’s own refusal rate on red-line stimuli is measured on a pinned grid, it is not 100%, and it is treated as one layer rather than as the control.
BoundaryWhich is why serving-time output filtering is mandatory rather than optional, and why the model is never exposed as an open service.
The corpus has hard provenance rules
No classified, customer or high-sensitivity data enters training without pseudonymization and human sign-off, and some classes never leave their trust boundary under any transform. No cross-edition contamination in either direction. No training on unlicensed data, and every run pins the hash of the corpus it consumed. No training on our own output without a held-out, human-verified evaluation set.
BoundaryThat last rule is the guard against model collapse and against a scorer quietly learning to reward-hack itself. It constrains how fast the flywheel can turn, deliberately.
Two findings we published because they generalize
Quantization can silently drop safety behaviour that full precision holds, so a quantized deployment needs its own safety evidence. And lexical filters are necessary but not sufficient: topic matching has to be paired with structural checks.
BoundaryBoth are stated as findings about the class of systems, not as proof that our own controls are complete.